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Revisiting the Debate on Constructing a
Theory of International Relations with
Chinese Characteristics*
Nele Noesselt†
Abstract
After decades of policy learning and adoption of “Western” theories of
international politics, the Chinese academic community has (re-)turned to
the construction of a “Chinese” theory framework. This article examines
the recent academic debates on theory with “Chinese characteristics” and
sheds light on their historical and philosophical foundations. It argues
that the search for a “Chinese” paradigm of international relations theory
is part of China’s quest for national identity and global status. As can be
concluded from the analysis of these debates, “Chinese” theories of inter-
national politics are expected to fulfil two general functions – to safeguard
China’s national interests and to legitimize the one-party system.
Keywords: foreign policy; Chinese model; Chinese school of international
relations; fifth generation of political leaders; legitimation strategies
China’s rise to global power status has triggered a debate about the interests and
orientations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in world politics.
International China watchers examine continuities and shifts in China’s foreign
policy to make predictions about China’s future international positioning strategy.
Whereas one school of thought assumes that conflict between the US, the old
power centre, and the currently rising PRC is inevitable, others argue that,
owing to increasing global interdependencies, an open conflict is unlikely to
occur. The most recent research puzzle concerns the impact on China’s foreign pol-
icy behaviour of the power transfer to the next generation (2012–13). Some analysts
predict a turn to more assertive behaviour and expect confrontations between
China and the West to rise.
Almost unnoticed in the Western research literature, Chinese political scientists
are concerned with the same research puzzles. On the one hand, they try to define
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China’s new identity as an international player and its strategic role in global pol-
itics. On the other hand, under the label of “constructing a theory with Chinese
characteristics” (or even a “Chinese school”), they conceptualize and interpret the
international system from a Chinese perspective and develop visionary interpre-
tations of a future world order.
Chinese foreign policy think tanks not only analyse recent changes and devel-
opment trends in the global system, but they also include perceptions and images
of the “self” and the “other” as well as the roles attributed to China by the out-
side world in their strategic calculations. The debate on developing a “Chinese
school” of international relations (IR) thus should not be misread as an abstract
theory discussion, but rather as a reflection of current constellations and shifts in
global politics and their impact on the PRC. While the IR debate takes place in
the socio-philosophical context of “Chinese” social science, it simultaneously
mirrors the international China debate and theories of international relations
that guide the behaviour of other states vis-à-vis the PRC. In fact, there is not
only one but a multitude of debates somehow associated with the “Chinese”
paradigm. The following analysis of these inner-Chinese IR discourses sheds
light on their epistemological and ontological foundations and proposes a subcat-
egorization of the different discourse elements according to their functional
dimension(s) and/or policy relatedness.
Inquiries into the Philosophy of Science and Research Traditions
Two cognitive sources can be said to underlie the current attempts to develop a
“Chinese” theory of international relations: Sinicized Marxism1 and (reinvented)
Confucianism.2 At first glance, this (re)turn to the past – to the early 20th cen-
tury, when Marxism-Leninism was reformulated into Mao Zedong Thought,3
or, respectively, to the times of the Hundred Schools in the pre-Qin era, which
is seen as the breeding ground for Chinese thinking about “inter-national” rela-
tions4 – appears quite paradoxical given the iconoclasm of the early Maoist per-
iod and Chinese scholars’ current attempts to establish innovative and
independent indigenous research approaches and theories. While Confucianism
belongs to the old order that Chinese communism claimed to overcome,
Marxism, being imported from the “West,” can certainly not be considered as
a distinct “Chinese” research tradition.
However, these two “traditions” of knowledge have guided theory as well
as policy formulation in China over the last few decades. They have been
merged into the concepts of a “(socialist) harmonious society” and a “(socialist)
peaceful rise,” put forward by the Hu–Wen administration.5 Nonetheless,
1 Cheng and Guo 2012; Wang, Cungang 2009; 2011.
2 Wang, Rihua 2011.
3 Schram 1989.
4 Chan 1999; Ye 2003; Xu, Jielin 2004.
5 Yu, Jianrong 2006.
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incompatibilities between the materialist legacy of Marxism and the more philo-
sophical legacy of pre-Qin state philosophy still persist – as the twists and turns in
Chinese foreign policy illustrate. It goes without saying that any analysis of the
“Chinese school” debate must begin by considering the ideational backbones
of the current debates among China’s political and academic elites.
Re-Marx: theory innovation for the 21st century
Even today, “Marxist” terminology and philosophy is still omnipresent in
Chinese IR debates. Following the modernization of IR research in China during
the 1980s – when decisions on the reform of the education system were implemen-
ted, milestones of Anglo-American IR studies were translated into Chinese and
the Chinese IR community generally took “Western” (mainly US-born) methods
and theories as their universal standard6 – Marxist IR approaches were reduced
to a side phenomenon in modern IR research, but they never completely vanished
from the scene. Official diplomatic and political discourse continues to use for-
eign policy terminology inherited from Maoist times, which is deeply inspired
by Marxist epistemology. Consequently, academic papers investigating recent
developments and the main orientations of Chinese politics integrate these offi-
cial terms of Chinese-style Marxism – such as “contradictions” (maodun 矛盾)
or the “characteristics of the era” (shidai tezheng时代特征) – into their analyses.7
Furthermore, as the majority of people working in universities or think tanks
in the 1980s and 1990s had been socialized in Maoist times and were trained
along the lines of Marxist philosophy, the reception of “Western” IR research
did not immediately result in a substitution of the general research frames used
for the analysis of world politics.8 Even though the younger generation of
Chinese IR scholars now often looks at the world through neo-realist glasses,
their research is at the same time deeply influenced by the remnants of
Maoist-Marxist concepts. Apart from terminology, Marxist IR approaches pro-
vide a certain view of world politics that engages in the critique of hegemony and
inequalities of global power contributions, which explains the overall tendency of
Chinese articles to condemn US hegemony and to vote for a “democratization of
international relations.”9
Bearing this in mind, the fact that a subject search for “Marxist IR”
(Makesizhuyi guoji guanxi lilun 马克思主义国际关系理论) on the China
Academic Journals database in May 2014 led to only 80 articles should not be
interpreted as a victory for “Western” IR frames over Maoist-Marxist ones.10
Articles on world politics and Chinese foreign relations are quite often just
descriptive assessments that do not mention theory at all.
6 Yu, Zhengliang, and Chen 1999; Ni and Xu 1997, 11.
7 Chen 2012, 136–38.
8 For an overview of the characteristics of the different generations of Chinese IR scholars, see Fang 2005.
9 Li, Bin 2005.
10 Database available at: http://oversea.cnki.net/kns55/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CJFD.
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Moreover, even in the 21st century, Marxism-Leninism, together with Mao
Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the theory of the “three representa-
tions” and the concept of scientific development, continues to be a pillar of the
Chinese party-state; all of these concepts have been written into the Party’s offi-
cial constitution. Marxism functions as an official state doctrine and as a forma-
tive element of the system’s identity as a socialist (one-party) state. A document
on the future of social sciences in China issued by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China in 2004 defines Marxism as an indispensable element
of any innovative reformulation of IR theory by Chinese academia.11 In 2004, in
order to support the reactivation of Marxism and to use it as the starting point
for a distinct “Chinese” theory formulation, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 launched a
huge Marx project that sponsors research on Marxist theory for the 21st cen-
tury.12 Chinese scholars involved in this project are currently working on his-
toriographical assessments of the evolution of Marxism abroad and in China,
and have to fulfil the challenging task of coining a Marxist theory that is
based on China’s past and more recent experiences. Along this line, the
“China model,” i.e. the hybrid mixture of plan and market under one-party
rule, is identified as part of “Marxist” research.13
Marxism as such is definitely not a “Chinese” theory, but if it is adapted to the
constellations in China (as done by Mao Zedong), it can at least be seen as an
amalgam of different ontological and epistemological traditions that can move
beyond the existing IR theory frames and could thus provide the starting point
for a “Chinese school.”14 However, as Marxism itself falls under the category
of “Western” theories, the argument that China’s theory innovation presents
an alternative to the “West” obviously lacks solid causal foundations.
Archaeological excavations
In addition toMaoist-Marxist epistemology and the research agenda derived there-
from (the focus on the objective laws of world development, historical and dialect-
ical materialism, as well as the unity of opposites), in 2005, QinYaqing秦亚青, one
of the keyproponents of theChinese discourse to construct a “Chinese school,”pos-
tulated that China’s IR contribution should consist in theorizing the “peaceful rise”
of a socialist country to global power.15 The theoretical assumptions derived from
China’s “socialist” experiences could, so the argument goes, then serve as an orien-
tation for other (non-democratic/non-capitalist) emerging powers.Qin’s reflections
are written as a counter-story to neo-realist scenarios of an inevitable conflict
between old and new power centres as well as between different civilizations.16
11 Central Committee 2004.
12 Chen 2012, 136.
13 Su 2012.
14 Wang, Cungang 2009, 8.
15 Qin 2005.
16 On the “clash of civilizations,” see Huntington 1996.
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In recent post-colonial assessments of IR theorizing beyond the West, the “har-
monious world” and the “peaceful rise” have been presented as potential
“Chinese” contributions to IR theory. The theoretical validity of these concepts,
however, is widely contested in, as well as outside, China. Both notions were first
introduced by China’s political leaders and subsequently developed by academic
society – only selected advisers from universities and think tanks were involved in
the shaping of these concepts.17 As a consequence, in order to step out of the
assumed political predominance of politics over political research, some scholars
involved in the “Chinese” IR debate(s) have turned from policy-linked
Maoist-Marxist frames towards ancient Chinese philosophy instead. Their
main points of reference are the Spring and Autumn period (770–476 BC) and
the Warring States period (475–221 BC), during which several small Chinese
kingdoms contended for leadership and hegemony. The interactions between
those kingdoms (which were unified under the victorious Qin emperor in 221
BC) and the related writings of the political advisors and state philosophers of
the time are seen as an historic example of “inter-national” relations in a regional
context far from the West.18
While the majority of related analyses is limited to an historical reconstruction
of structures and principles of interaction in ancient times, the “Tsinghua group,”
headed by Yan Xuetong 阎学通, looks at ancient Chinese philosophical texts to
excavate guiding strategies for political action. What they find, however, is not a
theory of international politics but rather a catalogue of “correct” ways of gov-
erning the country (and the world). Yan Xuetong has developed a threefold typ-
ology of political rule: “true kingship” (wang 王 or wangdao 王道) leads to a
stable international order; “hegemony” (ba霸) establishes hierarchies and asym-
metries, and the international order oscillates between stability (relations between
the hegemon and its allies) and chaos (confrontation between the hegemon and
its opponents); and “tyranny” (qiang 强) will inevitably lead to disaster and
decline.19 “True kingship,” also labelled “humane authority,” is the only way
to maintain a long-lasting and stable order. This resonates with the PRC’s sym-
bolic commitment to benevolence, peace and cooperation, as summarized under
the label of “great power” (daguo大国), which is held up as a Chinese alternative
to the old-style idea of expansion-based empire (diguo 帝国).
The claim that China’s international engagement does not follow the path of
military struggle for hegemony and zero-sum power competition also underlies
the current reinvention of the tianxia天下. The meanings ascribed to the tianxia
17 Zheng Bijian (Central Party School) is said to have been the key architect of the idea of a “peaceful rise,”
which he first used in a speech at the Bo’ao Forum in 2003 (Zheng 2003). It became officially presented
as a new foreign policy doctrine by Wen Jiabao in his speech at Harvard University in December 2003.
The “harmonious world” was introduced by Hu Jintao at the 60th anniversary of the founding of the
UN in September 2005. Chinese scholars, however, have pointed out that the notion had been tested
before in various bilateral diplomatic meetings. See Zhao, Kejin, and Ni 2007, 253.
18 Chan 1999; Ye 2003; Xu, Jielin 2004.
19 Yan 2008, 137.
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exemplify the Chinese imagination of what an “empire” should be about. Tianxia
stands for: “the whole country,” which, from a Western perspective, could be
labelled “China” or “Chinese empire”; “the whole world,” which did not repre-
sent the world in the geographical sense, but illustrated the geo-cultural construc-
tion of the world as the sum of territories and regions that had symbolically
accepted the authority of the Chinese emperor; or “Chinese civilization,” as
opposed to the illiterate “barbarian” tribes across the four oceans that, in
Chinese imaginations, surrounded Chinese territory.20
Translated into modern IR terminology, the notion of tianxia combines ideas
about the identities and roles of the main actors in the international system with
those of an idealized world order. While reflections on the tianxia have occupied
Chinese historians and philosophers over the past centuries, its current reinven-
tion and adaptation to the constellations of the 21st century have been inspired
by the writings of Zhao Tingyang 赵汀阳. Contributing to the general bashing
of the discursive hegemony of “Western” IR, Zhao identifies the Westphalian sys-
tem as a degenerated order linked with negative attributes: the international sys-
tem is anarchic; nation states compete against each other in zero-sum games; and
wars and conflicts result from the absence of an ethical code of conduct.21 In con-
trast to this dark scenario, he depicts the tianxia as a hierarchical but stable alter-
native blueprint for the 21st century.22 And even though, in political practice, the
Westphalian concept of the sovereign nation state has had a lasting effect on
China’s positioning in international politics, that China views itself as a “civiliza-
tional state,” displaying the legacy of China’s self-image as the centre of the tian-
xia, is still discernible in contemporary Chinese writings on Chinese foreign
affairs and international politics. According to Zhang Weiwei, a “civilizational
state,” in contrast to a nation state, does not rely on military-based expansion.
It does not copy any development model belonging to another state or empire,
and the guidelines of its strategic behaviour are derived from its own – and dis-
tinct – cultural traditions and historical patterns.23
This utopian construction of the world and China from a Chinese culture-
based perspective is not just a phenomenon of the 21st century, but has its historic
roots in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when China’s intellectual elites
struggled to rebuild China’s territorial integrity and its national sovereignty.
Among these literati scholars was Kang Youwei 康有为, who, in his
20 See the entries in the encyclopaedic dictionaries Hanyu da cidian (Luo Zhufeng (ed.). 1990) and
Zhongguo da baike quanshu (Hu Qiaomu (ed.). 1991).
21 Zhao, Tingyang 2005.
22 Zhao, Tingyang 2003. Zhao’s critics remark that this argument – i.e. the failure of the “Western” con-
cept of global order and the moral superiority of the tianxia – lacks empirical foundation and applies a
dual standard to the evaluation of “Western” and “Chinese” IR concepts. See Zhou, Fangyin 2008; Xu,
Jianxin 2007, 137. His supporters, however, try to integrate Zhao’s tianxia with global IR theorizing.
They argue that Zhao’s writings, which upgrade the tianxia from a regional institutional framework
to an abstract global model, overcome the shortcomings of theory approaches that continue to rely
on a state-centric construction of the international order. See Liu and Wang 2011.
23 Zhang, Weiwei 2012.
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Datongshu大同书 (Book of Great Unity), lay down the draft for a utopian world
community without any frontiers or territories – a global community beyond the
nation state, similar to a reformulation of the tianxia, this time not as a local, but
as a global order.24
Taking into account the historical circumstances under which Kang Youwei,
Zhao Tingyang and Zhang Weiwei propagate(d) their visionary models of a
world order derived from Chinese philosophy, it is more than obvious that, in
all these cases, these utopian models are part of an ongoing and unfinished state-
building process. The Datongshu was written in the shadow of the national
humiliation by external forces and the growing internal dispute over which was
the right path to modernize China. Only after the abolition of the “unequal treat-
ies,” forced upon the Chinese empire during the Opium Wars, did China regain
its status as a sovereign state. But, the quest to regain its old position of power
continues and determines China’s politics to date. The debate about a
“Chinese” IR theory thus finally reveals itself as a continuation of the late imper-
ial intellectual debates on self-strengthening and reform.25 Furthermore, it is at
the same time also a variation of the “China model” debate.26 The “China
model” illustrates the PRC’s claim to pursue an autochthonous development
path in domestic politics – and as such corresponds with the debate on construct-
ing a “Chinese” paradigm for international relations and world politics.
The Functional Dimensions of Theory Building
The above-sketched reflections on the functions of IR theorizing in China lead
one to the question of how the term “theory” (lilun 理论) itself is understood
among China’s epistemic communities. Furthermore, one has to differentiate
clearly between the meanings ascribed to IR theory in general and the particular
ones attributed to Chinese IR by outside observers, as well as those developed
and used in the inner-Chinese debates.
24 The ideational background of his utopian imagination is to be found in the Liji (Book of Rites), which
contains a whole chapter on the ideal order of society (liyun). The passage describes the decline of the
old order and the subsequent transition from the era of the datong (great unity) to the xiaokang (well-
off) society. The Gongyang commentary on the Liji, on which Kang Youwei bases his utopia, argues
that the development from datong to xiaokang is reversible. The return to the paradise lost, the old
order, has always been, and continues to be, a guiding principle in Chinese state philosophy. One of
the most prominent examples comes from Sun Yatsen, the founding father of the Chinese Republic,
who referred to the passage tianxia wei gong (meaning that all under heaven form a communality)
from the Liji to illustrate his vision of China’s future state constitution. See Bell 2008, 24.
25 In the late imperial era, China underwent a forced transformation and had to adapt to a “new” global
environment. The changes in the international system since 2007–08, catalysed by the global financial
crisis, pose a similar challenge that requires China’s elites to rethink the country’s foreign strategy
and to reformulate its international role conceptions.
26 Chinese scholars trace the “China model” back to the writings of Deng Xiaoping. This term stands for a
pragmatic and flexible development approach that integrates market economic principles with the over-
arching frame of a planned economy, and stands for high-speed economic growth. It is often contrasted
with the “Washington consensus,” a normative condition-based approach to national development, and
is presented as an alternative orientation model for the developing world. See Wang, Yukai 2008; Yu,
Keping 2008.
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Quite recently, Chinese IR debates have caught the attention of international
scholars engaged in a postmodern, post-colonial deconstruction and reconstruc-
tion of IR theory building. The assumption is that theory in general serves to ana-
lyse past events, to anticipate trends or, in a normative way, to guide or justify
political action. However, with regard to “Chinese IR,” Acharya and Buzan
introduce a wider definition of IR theory that integrates “the harder, positivist,
rationalist, materialist and quantitative understandings … and the more reflect-
ive, social, constructivist, and postmodern [understandings of the theory spec-
trum].”27 They also concede that IR might include normative assumptions;
even pre-theoretical concepts are viewed as elements of an emerging IR theory
framework in Asia. As a working definition, Acharya and Buzan propose label-
ling any IR concept that is either recognized as a theory by the international aca-
demic community or identified as such by its progenitors or, regardless of
academic acknowledgement, represents a systematic and abstract approach to
IR as a contribution to IR theory.28 While China’s historical theory and practice
of international relations have, with only a few exceptions, generally been ignored
by the international English-speaking IR community,29 the recent post-post trend
in international IR theory seems to follow the other extreme and takes concepts
as theory that, from a critical point of view, do not fulfil the basic requirements to
be grouped under the label of “theory” as defined in “general” IR.30
In contrast to this all-encompassing definition, Alagappa reduces theory in the
Asian context to a normative-constitutive function, which is directly linked to the
policy level.31 According to this understanding, theory does not function as a
framework for analysis, but is instead a tool for exerting power in international
politics. Alagappa assumes that “theory” in the Asian context “has a predomin-
antly practical orientation with emphasis on understanding and interpreting the
world to forge suitable national responses.”32
If one takes a closer look at Chinese writings on “theory,” one soon discovers
that there is also no unified definition. Generally, a Marxist understanding of the-
ory, which was imported during the early stages of Sino-Soviet cooperation and
ideological proximity, is still discernible in quite a few IR publications. The “offi-
cial” Chinese (Marxist) understanding of the meaning and function of (IR) the-
ory is that it is a system of concepts and principles that reflects the objective laws
of (political) processes. The main function of IR theory is to guide political
action.33 This definition has its roots in the Maoist era. In his essays, “On prac-
tice” and “On contradiction,” Mao Zedong proposed a recursive interrelation
27 Acharya and Buzan 2007, 291.
28 Ibid., 292.
29 One of the few IR scholars who integrated the Chinese case with the comparative history of international
relations in different regional contexts was Martin Wight. See Zhang, Yongjin 2014.
30 For a collection of post-colonial IR approaches that focus on non-Western regions, see Acharya and
Buzan 2010; Jones 2006; Shilliam 2011; and Tickner and Wæver 2009.
31 Alagappa 2011, 222.
32 Ibid., 194.
33 Wang, Jisi 1994, 482.
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between theory and practice based on dialectical materialism. Any theory has to
be deduced from political practice and verified by political practice.34 “Theory,”
according to Mao, was not something to be produced by the academic commu-
nity; rather, it should be formulated by the political leaders. The main aim of
these political “theories” was not to explain the world but to realize the socialist
world revolution.35
In the reform period, IR theories in the Chinese context have continued to
serve the dual function of guiding and legitimating political action. Obviously,
this understanding of “theory” is different from the definitions commonly agreed
upon in the general IR literature. If theory in China has to guide political practice,
itsmain focus has to be on foreign policy, and not on international or global politics
in general. Only frameworks applicable in the bi- and multilateral context of inter-
national politics are regarded as being worth studying.36 Contrary to this practical,
Marxist-inspired definition of “theory,” themore liberal school ofChinese IR scho-
lars affiliated with Fudan University 复旦大学 in Shanghai argues that “theory
should serve to promote the forward-looking awareness or predictive power of
international affairs and to serve to accumulate knowledge.”37 The field of IR the-
ory research in post-Maoist China has become more fragmented and pluralized,
reflecting the educational background of the different groups or networks of
scholars. Those educated at US or European universities often tend to rely on the
theory frameworks used at their foreign alma mater, while those engaged in theory
innovation are noticeably inspired by postmodern, critical IR approaches.
Geeraerts and Men postulate that, in the Chinese political context, the validity
of a “theory” is not measured in terms of its explanatory power but rather
according to its ideological soundness and its ability to guide political action.38
With regard to Chinese IR theory during the 1990s, Wang Jisi argued that “ideol-
ogy” was an essential element of any theory, whereas in the “Western” discourse,
ideological attributes were taken as evidence that non-“Western” IR lacks a sci-
entific foundation and should instead be classified as strategy.39
While the majority of Chinese IR publications are rather descriptive and sel-
dom operate with an abstract theory framework, articles belonging to the “the-
ory” category are often overview articles of theory debates in the “West.” Only
5 per cent of the articles published in Chinese IR journals deal with the formu-
lation of a “Chinese” IR theory, whatever this term might stand for.40
In Chinese analyses of international relations theory, narratives such as the
“end of history”41 and the inevitable breakdown of communism, the “clash of
34 Mao 1937.
35 Chan 1997, 59.
36 Ren 2000, 20.
37 Chan 1998, 16.
38 Geeraerts and Men 2001, 252.
39 Wang, Jisi 1994.
40 Qin 2009.
41 Fukuyama 1992.
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civilizations”42 and the paradigm of “democratic peace” are all identified as ele-
ments of foreign strategy that help to cement and stabilize the predominant pos-
ition of the US on the global stage.43 This clearly shows that “theories,”
according to the “Chinese” understanding, bear a strategic connotation. If the
assumptions were correct that the theory-formulating state generally tends to pre-
sent its concepts as universally applicable frames and not as part of its national
strategic calculations, Chinese publications could thus be expected to group the
“Chinese school” debate under the rubric of “theory.”
However, a closer look at Chinese academic publications reveals that concepts
such as the “peaceful rise” or the “harmonious world” are simultaneously classi-
fied both as strategy (zhanlüe战略) and theory (lilun) and that these two categor-
ies are often used interchangeably. Moreover, quite a few studies by Chinese IR
scholars deal with the thoughts (sixiang思想) on international politics of China’s
political leaders, which they regard as the main sources of “Chinese” IR –
although these studies do not develop a systemic set of hypotheses and theoretical
assumptions.44 Some Chinese articles, however, operate with the logical differen-
tiation between diplomatic strategy and IR theory, thus linking strategy to states’
foreign relations and not to world politics, which is conceived as a more abstract
category.45
The reference to “strategy” illustrates that this stream of IR research is still
focused on the operational dimension of “theory” – understood as a tool for
measuring and predicting developments in China’s external environment and
for configuring appropriate positioning measures. The mentioning of IR
“thought,” by contrast, stresses the ideational dimensions of IR theory building
in China. The collected writings of China’s political leaders on world politics
operate with constructions and interpretations of the world that do not necessar-
ily reflect political “reality,” but are compatible with the system’s ideological
underpinnings and justify certain political actions.
Given the plurality of views and methodological approaches prevailing among
China’s epistemic communities, it would obviously not make sense to reduce the
notion of “theory” to one single definition. There are definitely scholars who seek
to overcome the perceived parochialism and hegemony of concepts derived from
European history by adding frames derived from Chinese history to the ongoing
global debate on the reformulation of IR in the post-Cold War period. It remains,
however, questionable whether this approach might lead to the creation of a
novel and universal IR theory, or will just broaden the historical-empirical reposi-
tory of IR theorizing.
The main innovative potential of the Chinese IR debate is presumably not the
formulation of any completely new analytical understanding or normative
42 Huntington 1996.
43 Hu 2003.
44 Observation based on searches for the combination of “theory,” “strategy” and “international relations”
on the China Academic Journals database.
45 Yang 2004.
International Relations with Chinese Characteristics 439
construction of world politics. Chinese scholars who specialize in pre-modern
China’s history and philosophy of international relations identify many parallels
and equivalents to “Western” IR. The greatest point of divergence between
“Western” and “Chinese” theory-based IR research is to be found in calculations
and projections of China’s current and future posture in the global realm. These
“theories,” however, should not be misread as analytical frames. They develop an
idealized image of the world that is favourable to national development interests.
In order to avoid being misled by the term “theory,” one should consider refer-
ring to IR debates in China not as systematic frameworks of analysis, but rather
as “world views” that “do not reflect the world… [but] represent it, not only con-
straining our vision but also enabling us to develop a language of concepts and
terms that in turn make it possible to talk intelligibly about IR.”46 A “Chinese”
theory of international relations would thus look at the world from a “Chinese”
perspective and include strategic calculations. As such, it would not only consist
of visionary interpretations of how the world should be organized, but also com-
prise reflections on the “self” and the “other.” Given that the emergence of the
search for a “Chinese” IR theory is linked to the launching of the reform pro-
gramme, one could expect that this debate, rather than formulate an abstract
blueprint for international and global interactions, primarily reflects national
and domestic concerns.
Chinese IR Theory and Political Action
The remaining tantalizing question is whether the formulation of “Chinese” IR
theories can be expected to have any impact on China’s foreign behaviour.47
Analysts of China’s strategic culture have argued that China’s external actions
are inspired by elements of Confucian-Mencian as well as legalist-realist “para-
bellum” calculations.48 While Johnston’s category of “cultural realism” acknowl-
edges the existence of both traditions in China’s security thinking, he identifies
parabellum elements as the operational code, and classifies elements of
Confucian-Mencian culture as part of the autocommunication among China’s
political and intellectual elites. Responding to these statements, Feng Huiyun
argues that strategic culture is not a static, unchangeable frame, but is highly
context-dependent.49 Feng states that Johnston’s selection of Chinese texts (the
Seven Military Classics50) and the time frame chosen (Ming dynasty) lead to
results that could not be taken as universal patterns of Chinese strategic culture.
According to Feng, Confucian ideas of benevolence, justice and righteousness are
still the key determinants of China’s foreign politics, although they do not imply
46 Griffiths 2007, 1.
47 For a case-based examination of the relationship between “Chinese” IR theory and Chinese foreign pol-
itics, see Wang, Hung-Jen 2013.
48 Johnston 1995.
49 Feng 2007.
50 For an English translation, see Sawyer 1993.
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that the political elites will accept actions directed against China that could harm
its national sovereignty or territorial integrity.51Again, China’s rather pragmatic
conduct of foreign relations in the post-Maoist period has led many scholars to
assume a predominance of “realpolitik” frames in Chinese IR thinking.52
The overall question under which this controversy over the identification of the
operational code of Chinese foreign policy falls is, once more, whether China
possesses a unique political (and strategic) culture sui generis or whether it emu-
lates elements of strategic traditions similar to the ones practised (and reflected)
by the “Western” world. Chinese scholars engaged in the archaeological excava-
tion of Chinese IR traditions do not care too much about the similarities and dis-
similarities between “Chinese” and “Western” political philosophy in general;
they are more concerned with ascertaining the predominance of harmony over
belligerence in China’s tradition-based IR thinking.53 Partly opposing this
approach, Victoria Hui stresses that history, not abstract philosophy, should
guide the search for a “Chinese school.”54 This statement, composed as a
response to “Chinese” criticism of her comparative monograph on world order
in the Chinese and the European historical context,55 highlights an often over-
looked aspect: not all of the texts and research approaches grouped under the
label of a “Chinese school” operate on the same level. Studies on the ideational,
philosophical traditions of the tianxia system or the interactions between the ruler
and the ruled do not necessarily depict political reality. Following this line, litera-
ture on historical political philosophy might be seen as corresponding to
“Western” research on Kant or Rousseau – who are not regarded as architects
of any kind of systematic IR theory formulation but instead are seen as represen-
tatives of certain philosophical streams that inspired theory building. The reflec-
tion on political ideas and philosophy is often rather disjointed from “real”
political practice. Theories as analytical frames and strategies, by contrast, are
generally derived from concrete historical events (often critical junctures in
world politics).
Furthermore, one should distinguish between the theoretical-philosophical
narrative of China’s foreign relations and the ideational patterns of foreign
behaviour and practices of interactions deduced therefrom, and those frames
used to calculate the strategic responses of other players in the international sys-
tem. Foreign policy discourses often stick to ideational paradigms and present a
country’s foreign policy as legitimate interests. Likewise, studies on China’s
51 Ibid.
52 Christensen 1996.
53 Given the movement of ideas and nomothetic assumptions between Asia and Europe and processes of
learning, emulation and eclectic indigenization, it would be rather misleading to conceive of both philo-
sophical traditions as insulated sets of norms and values. The Sinification of Marxism and its merging
with Legalist, Daoist and Confucian-Mencian philosophy, as practised by contemporary Chinese IR
scholars either intentionally or unintentionally, indicates that one has to think of China’s strategic cul-
ture as a hybrid amalgam that combines different, often even antagonist, streams of thought.
54 Hui 2010; 2012.
55 Hui 2005.
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participation in world affairs present its engagement as standing in line with its
general moral and ethical foundations. The actions and moves of other players,
by contrast, are often described by applying neo-realist frameworks that identify
power maximization and national security interests as determinants of the behav-
iour of other powers in the international system.
If the ideational dimension of the Chinese IR debate is first of all a discursive,
legitimating element, one might be tempted to assume a general incompatibility
between the country’s nomothetic-ethical ideas and its foreign policy conduct.
However, as various scholars have pointed out before, China’s reluctance to
resort to military means could be taken as an indicator, although not final
proof, of the predominance of “harmony” over “use of force.”56 Shih Chih-Yu
and Huang Chiung-Chiu, who look at China’s foreign policy through the analyt-
ical glasses of Confucianism, argue that China’s external behaviour tends to
achieve a “balance of relationships,” and not a “balance of power” as realist
theories would predict.57 As they correctly highlight, China’s (re)turn to
Confucianism should not be misread as a general negation of the use of force,
including the right of self-defence. One should not forget that Confucianism is
only one of the various ideational streams that shape China’s foreign policy in
theory and practice. The combination of legalist and Confucian-Mencian ideas
enhanced by elements taken from “Western” social science and political philoso-
phy, which function as mind maps for China’s elites, results in political practices
that, despite their Confucian-Mencian ingredients, can be quite rational and stra-
tegic. At the same time, however, this rationalist dimension of Chinese politics
should not be misunderstood as leading to a neo-realist practice of power polit-
ics.58 What Shih and Huang label the “power of relationships” stands in line with
earlier culture-based psychological explanations of Chinese politics.59 The bal-
ance of relationship approach is based on the hypothesis that states’ behaviour
in bilateral interactions is not about maximizing power and pursuing national
interests. Instead, it assumes that states will agree to make concessions to protect
relational security and to reduce uncertainty – observable not only in Chinese for-
eign policy but likewise applicable, as the authors argue, to the US (whose for-
eign policy is identified as a combination of balance of power and balance of
relationships).60
To grasp the different functional dimensions of the “Chinese school” debate,
one has to differentiate clearly between the level of foreign policy and world pol-
itics. With regard to the former, the “Chinese” debate materializes as ex-post
discussion, often including justificatory elements, about foreign policy decision
making. If one conceives of IR theory as analytical lenses that help to select
56 Shih and Huang 2012. On philosophy and tradition in Chinese foreign policy, see the 2013 special issue
of the Journal of Chinese Political Science (17).
57 Shih and Huang 2012.
58 Ibid.
59 Pye 1968; Shih 1990.
60 Shih and Huang 2012, 2.
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data and to reduce the complexity of world politics, one could argue that Chinese
scholars have already successfully developed their own analytical frames to make
sense of the world from a “Chinese” perspective. Whereas neo-realist theories
interpret the PRC’s border disputes with the Soviet Union, India or Vietnam
as an expression of hard-core power politics, Chinese scholars stress the overall
focus on harmony and argue that all these actions were undertaken to restore
order. The Chinese side argues that Chinese foreign policy remains determined
by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and relies on harmony and stabil-
ity. The maritime expeditions of Ming dynasty China, in contrast to Western
colonial powers, did not end up with a military conquest of overseas territories.
Again, if one looks at PRC history, the so-called “punitive mission” against
Vietnam ended with the withdrawal of Chinese troops behind the old border
lines.61
With regard to world politics, Chinese scholars have outlined normative
incompatibilities between “Chinese” and “Western” views on world order.62
Given these ideational gaps, these Chinese publications assume that states,
even in similar situations, do not act in a similar way. Although most Chinese
IR scholars agree that no systematic “Chinese” IR theory has been developed
so far, abstract ideas and concepts that have been derived from China’s political
culture and philosophy more or less directly influence China’s behaviour – and so
define the way in which Chinese scholars (and the political elites) view the world
and perceive the other players involved. The actions taken, however, certainly do
not rely on “Confucian-Mencian” ideals but mirror rational strategic cost-benefit
calculations.
Conclusion
This article has shown that, in order to make sense of the “Chinese School”
debate, one has to differentiate between two functional dimensions of theory/
strategy formulation. The academic debate still sticks to meta-theoretical reflec-
tions on the possibility of producing a distinct “Chinese” IR theory and discusses
its conceptual sources. Even though there is no single unified understanding of
theory, many researchers engage in rather abstract research on the history and
philosophy of Chinese “international” politics and seek to identify potential
add-ons or alternatives to the established “Western” theory frames. The foreign
policy debate, also grouped under the “Chinese school” approach, by contrast,
has produced a range of “new” IR concepts – which are presented as elements
of Chinese ancient thought on order and principles of interactions.
61 Again, others, most likely (external) observers who operate with different analytical lenses, might argue
that the official story that China never practised any kind of expansionism is easily disproved by com-
paring the territory enlarged by the post-Qin dynasties with the one currently claimed by the PRC
(which inherits the border lines of the late Qing dynasty that incorporate Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang).
62 Pan 2012.
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Given that leading scholars and think tank researchers serve as advisors to the
Chinese government on issues of international politics, there are direct linkages
between the academic debate(s) and the official political strategy discourse.
Theoretical reflections on power distributions and principles of interactions are
merged into policy recommendations. Chinese scholars calculate the impact of
existing theories on the strategic decisions of China’s regional and global neigh-
bours. The “peaceful rise” and the “harmonious world” are coined as “new”
frames to present an alternative labelling and interpretation of China’s foreign
policy that does not subscribe to the current neo-realist “new assertiveness”
debate. Furthermore, Chinese scholars contributing to this stream of research
reject any theory that would contradict the PRC’s claim to pursue an independ-
ent development strategy that is different from the “West”63 – as this would imply
a transition towards democracy – and also draw a clear line between the theory
and practice of the Chinese “model” and the development strategies of other
(failed) socialist systems. By introducing an “independent” IR terminology
such as daguo and wangdao, rooted in the Chinese classics, Chinese scholars
implicitly deny the applicability of “Western” concepts (hegemony) and related
scenarios (power competition, imperial expansionism) to the Chinese case.
These narratives target two audiences: with regard to Chinese society, they con-
solidate the image of an independent Chinese approach to politics and justify
China’s development strategy by presenting it as a history- and tradition-based
approach. Addressing the international community of states, and especially
China’s regional neighbours, Chinese IR concepts seek to defuse threat percep-
tions. Accordingly, these concepts function as elements of soft power building
and public diplomacy.64 However, it remains questionable how far this reference
to a Confucian heritage of Chinese politics determines and constrains China’s
foreign behaviour.
One way to decipher the multiple coexisting “Chinese” strategy and theory
approaches is to apply Johnston’s distinction between ideational and operational
dimensions of Chinese (foreign) strategy. Along this line, the reinvention of
Chinese traditions and references to philosophical notions in China’s official pol-
icy discourse serves domestic purposes. It contributes to national identity build-
ing and symbolically stabilizes political rule. The conduct of Chinese foreign
policy, however, mainly relies on rational cost-benefit calculations and often
operates with assumptions drawn from “Western” IR.
Apart from foreign relations, the “Chinese” IR debate also covers the world
order dimension. This includes ideas on ordering principles, power distribution
and the overall structure of the world system. The current international system
is seen as unfair and unilaterally dominated by the US and its allies – the search
for a “Chinese” paradigm of IR theory thus finally reveals itself as part of
China’s global positioning ambitions.
63 This has also been formulated in Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012.
64 China’s soft power approach has been elaborated by Li, Jie 2007 and Yu, Xintian 2008.
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While the overall “Chinese” theory debate has remained rather abstract – the
2013 conferences on IR theory research in China stressed the need to develop a
“Chinese theory” that might start from China’s Confucian-Mencian culture, but
failed to come up with systematic theory assumptions65 – the field of international
political economy is where “new” theory (or rather strategy) elements become
manifest. Taking the global financial crisis of 2007–08 as a starting point,
Chinese IR scholars, especially those who follow a Marxist IR approach, have
recently referred to the crisis as empirical evidence of the failures of capitalism
and the “Western” approach to global financial governance.66 China is the
most active advocate of a reform of international institutions and global financial
governance. Since 2008, China has continuously reiterated its demands through
the BRICS joint declarations, G20 meetings and Davos summits. In March
2009, the head of the National Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan 周小川, pre-
sented a proposal for replacing the US dollar with a new supranational currency
unit.67 Behind these public statements hides a huge controversial debate on the-
ories of international political economy (as a subfield of international relations)
and their Sinification as conducted by China’s epistemic communities.
The various workshops and conferences on “Chinese” IR held over the last few
years have had to fulfil the challenging task of elaborating add-ons that are com-
patible with China’s official foreign strategy but that also pay tribute to China’s
new status as the world’s second largest economy, the number one creditor of the
US and a central player in the reform of the architecture of the global financial
system. In highly generalized terms, the Chinese debate on international politics
and the construction of a theory “with Chinese characteristics” can thus be sub-
divided into those articles that discuss the current state of international politics
and criticize the existing structures, and those that define ways to reformulate
China’s foreign strategy and to upgrade China’s status in world politics.
Although both debates are highly heterogeneous, one can assume that at least
some elements of these debates will be included in the re-evaluation and, poten-
tially, also in the remodelling of China’s strategy under the new fifth generation.
提要:经过几十年的政策学习和采纳 “西方”国际政治理论,中国学术界开始
转向建立 “中国” 的理论框架。本文分析了中国学术界对 “有中国特色” 的
理论的最新论述并揭示了其历史和哲学的根源。本文论证了寻求国际关系
理论的 “中国”范式是中国追求国家认同和全球地位的一部分。从对中国学
术界辩论的分析中可以得出的结论是有中国特色的国际政治理论可以发挥
两个作用 -维护中国的国家利益和巩固中国一党制及其统治的合法性。
关键词: 中国对外战略; 中国模式; 国际关系理论的中国学派; 第五代; 合法
性战略
65 Song 2013.
66 Wang, Xiangsui 2011, 21.
67 Zhou, Xiaochuan 2009.
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